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Can organisational safety climate and occupational stress predict work-related driver 
fatigue? 
 
Abstract 
Road crashes are a significant cause of work-related injury and death.  Driver fatigue 
is thought to cause 20-30% of fatal crashes.  The current study utilised a survey to 
examine the relationship between safety climate, occupational stress and work-related 
driver fatigue.  Drivers (n= 219) from two government organisations responded to 
items from the Job Related Tension Scale (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn & Snoek, 1964), 
Safety Climate Questionnaire (Glendon & Litherland, 1991) and purpose-designed 
items on fatigue related behaviour.  Outcome measures were current self-reported, 
fatigue-related behaviour and self-reported ‘near (crash) misses’ during the previous 6 
months.  Together, occupational stress and safety climate predicted fatigue-related 
behaviour, accounting for 29% of the variance over and above that explained by 
control variables. Further, logistic regression revealed occupational stress and safety 
climate to be significant predictors of fatigue-related near misses. Safety climate 
emerged as a stronger predictor of both fatigue-related behaviour and near misses than 
occupational stress.  Results suggest that organisations can play a part in improving 
the safety-related behaviours of their workforce through attention to safety climate 
and occupational stress.  
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Occupational stress 
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1. Introduction  
Workplace safety attracts considerable attention from governments, 
organisations, employees and safety researchers because it carries with it far reaching 
implications both economically and socially.  Work-related vehicle crashes have been 
reported as the leading cause of work-related injury and death in a number of 
countries, including the US (Pratt, 2003), France (Charbotel, Chiron, Martin & 
Bergeret, 2001), UK (Health and Safety Executive, 2001) and Australia (Haworth, 
Tingvall & Kowaldo, 2000).  In Australia reports suggest that crashes involving fleet 
vehicles account for 25% of overall road fatalities and 43% of work-related fatalities 
(Meers, 2002; Murray, Newnam, Watson, Davey & Schonfeld, 2003).  Total direct 
cost of crashes (from all causes) in Australia are estimated in the order of $15 billion 
per annum (1996 data) (BTE, 2000), making these work-related crashes expensive to 
businesses, with indirect costs from physical, psychological and economic 
consequences having substantial impact on the community. 
Difficulties in fatigue measurement and reporting methods make it 
problematic to determine precisely what proportion of road crashes are due to fatigue.  
However, it is generally accepted that driver fatigue accounts for around 20-30% of 
fatal road crashes (House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Communications, Transport and the Arts, 2000).  In addition, fatigue has been shown 
to be a particularly prevalent factor in work-related crashes (Harrison, Mandryk & 
Frommer, 1993).   
Though there is increasing awareness that driver fatigue plays a significant 
role in many work-related motor vehicle crashes, this area is under researched when 
compared to other road safety risks such as speeding and drink driving (Brown, 1994; 
Haworth, et al., 2000; Philip et al., 2003).   
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Recognising the importance of work-related driving to injury has led to 
research investigating the impact of organisational factors on driver safety and to a 
lesser extent, driver fatigue.  This trend reflects a fundamental shift in thinking 
regarding the roles that organisations play in influencing the safety behaviours of 
employees.  Historically, driver safety research has focussed on individual 
characteristics, attempting to elucidate what makes one individual safer than another 
(Wills, Watson & Biggs, 2007).  At the organisational level a number of researchers 
have begun to investigate factors such as roster designs and consecutive hours spent 
working and how they relate to driver fatigue (Arnold et al, 1997; Baas, Charlton & 
Baston, 2000).  However, this research has generally concentrated on high-risk groups 
such as long distance truck drivers.  The present study aimed to extend previous 
research by focusing specifically on organisational influences of work-related driver 
fatigue rather than individual influences and by utilising a mixed driver population.   
 
1.1. Driver fatigue 
 
For the purposes of description, fatigue is often referred to as a feeling of 
tiredness and reduced alertness that is associated with drowsiness, which impairs both 
capability and willingness to perform a task (Craig, Tran, Wijesuriya, & Boord, 2006; 
Lal & Craig, 2001).  Fatigue contributes to crash risk by significantly increasing 
reaction times and degrading driving performance (Philip et al., 2003).   
Typically fatigue research has focused on individual factors such as amount or 
quality of sleep, age, or physical health (Stutts, Wilkins, Osberg & Vaughn, 2003).  
Such studies have shown that lack of sleep, low sleep quality or excessive daytime 
sleepiness are significant predictors of driver fatigue as well as fatigue-related crashes 
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(Arnold et al., 1997; Gander et al., 2006; Hartley, 2004; Van den Berg & Landstrom, 
2006).  Driving at times of the day that would normally be spent sleeping, or driving 
for prolonged periods are also associated with increased crash risk (Folkard, 1997; 
Hartley, 2004). Other studies have examined personality-related (e.g. sensation 
seeking and extraversion) (Thiffault & Bergeron, 2003) and psychological 
characteristics such as depression and anxiety (Craig et al., 2006; Lal & Craig, 2001) 
showing an association between high levels of these factors and greater propensity 
towards driver fatigue.  
Stress and its contribution to fatigue has also been extensively examined in the 
past and is well recognised in the literature (Maconald, 2003; Mathews, 2002; Tepas 
& Price, 2001).  Stress can be thought of as a result of a perceived imbalance between 
demands and resources (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) such that the individual cannot 
mobilise sufficient resources to meet the current demands.  This produces tension 
which may be experienced physically, emotionally or mentally.  The impact of stress 
on fatigue is complex and person specific (Beehr, 2000), as individual factors such as 
coping style, personality traits and social support all play a role in moderating the 
extent to which stress is experienced (Legree, Heffner, Psotka, Martin & Medsker, 
2003).   
 
1.2. Occupational stress  
Occupational stress is a term used to describe stress that originates from the 
work environment (Cartwright, Copper & Barron, 1996).  Occupational stress is 
different from other life stresses in that organisations play a role in moderating the 
extent of the stress experienced (Cartwright, et al., 1996).  For example, poor 
job/position design, poor job support, and high workload are all likely to contribute to 
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workers’ experiences of occupational stress.  Manifestations of occupational stress 
can include physical depletion, emotional drain, absenteeism, and reduced efficiency 
and performance (Cushway, Tyler & Nolan, 1996; Farber, 1990). 
Though as highlighted above, there is considerable individual variation in the 
experience of stress, including occupational stress, research has provided strong 
support for a link between occupational stress and the safety behaviours and safety 
outcomes of workers (Sutherland & Cooper, 1991; Westerman & Haigney, 2000).  
Research has revealed that occupational stressors contribute to decreased driving 
performance and vigilance and therefore an increase in crash risk (Legree, Heffner, 
Psotka, Martin & Medsker, 2003).  Further, Cartwright et al. (1996) reported that 
occupational stress was predictive of road crashes in work-related drivers.  
While occupational stress has been linked to fatigue and road safety 
behaviours and outcomes, the relationship between occupational stress and work-
related driver fatigue is yet to be examined.  This relationship warrants further 
investigation and empirical evaluation particularly when considering the implications 
for both organisational safety management and organisational liability in cases of 
highly stressed employees. 
 
1.3. Safety climate 
Safety climate represents another organisational influence on driver safety.  A 
large body of research supports the role of organisational safety climate in predicting 
safety behaviors and safety outcomes (see Clarke, 2006).  While it is noted that there 
is no consensus as to the specific definition of safety climate (see Griffin & Neal, 
2000; Wills, Watson & Biggs, 2006) it is apparent that there are some commonalities 
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to the thinking behind the concept within the broader framework of organisational 
culture. 
Organisational culture is typically described as the shared attitudes, values, 
beliefs and behaviors that occur within an organisation (Cooper, 2000; Glendon & 
Stanton, 2000).  Those shared attitudes, values, norms, ideas, beliefs and behaviors 
that impact upon employees’ exposure to risk while at work can be seen as the safety 
culture of the organisation (Gulenmund, 2000).  Consistent with this, fleet safety 
culture may be considered an aspect of safety culture that is specific to road safety.  
Fleet safety culture encompasses not only the safety behaviors of fleet drivers, but 
also how management practices impact on driving and how driver safety is valued 
within the organisation (Wills, Biggs & Watson, 2005).   
Organisational safety climate is a conceptually related construct described as 
the psychological mechanism through which safety culture impacts the way in which 
employees behave at work (Cooper, 2000; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Wills et al., 
2005).  While debate exists as to the nature of the distinction between culture and 
climate (Flin, Mearns, O’Conner & Bryden, 2000), safety climate typically refers to 
workers’ perceptions of the way in which the organisation views and manages safety 
(Cooper, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000.  Important factors that comprise organisational 
safety climate include perceptions of: management values (e.g. management concern 
for employee well-being); management and organisational practices (e.g. adequacy of 
training, provision of safety equipment, quality of safety management systems, 
communication); and employee involvement in workplace health and safety (Neal, 
Griffin & Hart, 2000).  The methodological advantage of the culture/climate 
distinction is that perceptions are amenable to quantitative measurement in a similar 
way to other psychological constructs such as attitudes or cognitive ability, whereas 
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culture manifests itself via shared values, norms, ideas, practices, beliefs and 
behaviors that are fundamentally more complex and abstract, and therefore difficult to 
measure quantitatively (Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Wills et al., 2005).  
Road safety researchers have provided support for the link between safety 
climate and safety-related driver behavior and outcomes. For example, Wills et al. 
(2006) found that safety climate was able to significantly predict a number of driver 
safety-related behaviors including traffic violations, driver error, driving while 
distracted, and pre-trip vehicle maintenance in a sample of state government 
employees. In addition, Morrow and Crum (2004) reported that perceptions that 
trucking company employees held of management safety practices were predictive of 
reported fatigue while driving and fatigue-related near misses.  However, the findings 
of Morrow and Crum (2004) are specific to high-risk drivers, and the relationship 
between safety climate and work-related driver fatigue in other driver populations is 
yet to be examined.  
 
1.4. Study aims 
The present study aimed to empirically evaluate the influence of occupational 
stress and organisational safety climate on fatigue-related driving behaviour after 
controlling for a number of individual control variables.  In addition, the study aimed 
to evaluate whether these same variables could predict self-reported near misses that 
were attributed to driver fatigue. 
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2. Method 
2.1. Participants  
Drivers from two state-government organisations with an interest in driver 
fatigue were approached to participate in the study.  Consistent with research of this 
nature, work-related drivers were considered to be those who drove at least once per 
week for work purposes (Newnam, Watson & Murray, 2004; Wills et al., 2006).  The 
sample consisted of 219 participants from a total of 1,458 surveys distributed to the 
participating organisations, representing an overall response rate of 15%1.  The final 
sample used in the hierarchical regression analysis was 211 work-related drivers (8 
were excluded due to missing data), while a sample of 204 work-related drivers was 
used for logistic regression analysis due to an additional 7 cases of missing data on 
the near miss variable.  
Respondents (53% male, 46.1% female, 2 unspecified sex) indicated that they 
drove in a variety of city, sub-urban and rural environments.  The mean age of drivers 
was 42.6 years (SD = 10.1) with the majority (43.5%) of drivers in the 40-50 year age 
bracket.  The reported average number of hours per week spent driving for work 
purposes was 9.8 hours (SD = 7.2).  The majority (64.2%) of drivers drove cars, 
29.8% drove 4WD vehicles and the remainder reporting driving utilities (2.3%), light 
trucks (.5%), and vans (3.2%).  
 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that this response rate was around half that anticipated given that similar studies 
conducted by the research team had achieved response rates of 30% (Wills et al, 2006).  Based on 
feedback from safety representatives within the participating organisations, it appears that this lower 
than expected response rated was due to internal delays in the mailing of the questionnaires, which 
resulted in an unknown number received close to and after the specified return date. Morever, this 
problem appears to have been general in nature and thus should not have contributed to any systematic 
non-response bias. 
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2.2. Procedure 
Prior to commencement of the study ethical approval was sought from the 
Queensland University of Technology human research ethics committee.  
Arrangements were then made to consult with safety representatives from the 
participating organisations; questionnaires were distributed to regional safety 
personnel via each organisation’s internal mailing system for final distribution to 
work-related drivers.  Drivers received a package consisting of: an information sheet 
detailing the nature of the study and assuring confidentiality; a covering letter from 
each organisation’s management confirming support for the study; instructions for 
completing the questionnaire; the questionnaire itself; and a reply paid envelope.  This 
procedure ensured the anonymity and confidentiality of the participants, and was 
designed to maximize the response rate. 
 
2.3. Measures 
2.3.1 Control Variables 
 The variables age, gender and time spent driving for work per week were 
included in the study as control variables since younger drivers, and males have been 
shown to be involved in a higher number of fatigue-related crashes than other older 
drivers and females, respectively (Horne & Reyner, 1995; Pack, et al., 1995).  In 
addition, those people who drive more often (have greater exposure) have also been 
shown to be involved in greater numbers of fatigue-related crashes (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and the Arts, 
2000; Stutts, Wilkins, Osberg & Vaughn, 2003).  
 
2.3.2 Occupational stress.  
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The Job Related Tension Scale (JRTS) (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn & Snoek, 1964) 
was included in the questionnaire to measure occupational stress.  The scale has been 
found to have sound internal reliability of 0.81 and discriminant validity (Gonzalez-
Roma, Luna, Espejo, & Baeza, 1992).  MacKinnon (1978) provides further details of 
the psychometric properties of the scale.  The JRTS is considered a measure of 
subjective stress rather than exposure to stressors, as the instructions direct 
participants to respond to questions based on how much each item bothers them 
(Gonzalez-Roma et al., 1992).  The 15 items are scored on a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from “never” to “nearly all the time”, with higher scores indicating higher 
levels of occupational stress.  An example of an item is “Feeling that you have too 
little authority to carry out the responsibilities assigned to you”.  In this study the 
internal reliability of the scale was high, with Cronbach’s alpha = .90.   
 
2.3.3. Fleet safety climate.  
A previously adapted version of Glendon and Litherland’s (1991) Safety Climate 
Questionnaire (SCQ) was used to measure safety climate.  Wills, Watson and Biggs 
(2004) adapted the SCQ for a fleet vehicle setting with a focus on work-related driver 
safety where it proved useful in explaining driver safety-related behaviour.  As such 
this adaptation was considered more suitable for the present study sample than the 
original SCQ.  The scale contains 35 items scored on a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from “never” to “always”, with higher scores indicating safer perceptions.  Wills et al. 
(2005) report on the development and factor structure of the modified SCQ.  The 
scale consists of 6 dimensions of safety climate: communication and procedures (13 
items); work pressure (7 items); management commitment (4 items); relationships (5 
items); driver training (3 items); safety rules (3 items).  Wills et al. (2005) reported a 
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Cronbach’s alpha of .95 for the scale.  For this study, Cronbach’s alpha was similarly 
high at .97.   
 
2.3.4. Self-reported, fatigue-related behaviour.  
Five purpose-designed items were generated from the driver fatigue literature 
to reflect the fundamental aspects of driver fatigue behaviour (Table 1).  For example, 
some studies report that driving after working for extended periods of time is 
associated with driver fatigue (Arnold et al., 1997) hence the item “How often do you 
drive after working for extended periods of time?” was included.  Furthermore, it is 
well recognised that driving after insufficient sleep is associated with driver fatigue 
(Arnold et al., 1997; Gander, Marshal, James & Le Quesne, 2006; Hartley, 2004) 
hence the item “How often do you drive after having insufficient sleep?” was 
included.  All items were measured on a five point Likert scale from 1 (never) to 5 
(very frequently) with higher scores indicating more frequent driving while fatigued.  
This scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .82 and thus demonstrated high internal 
reliability.  
 
Insert table 1 about here 
 
2.3.5. Self-reported, fatigue-related near misses. 
A second outcome measure was utilised that consisted of a single-item 
question about fatigue-related near misses.  This was used in place of a question about 
fatigue-related crashes for several reasons.  Firstly, crashes themselves are relatively 
infrequent occurrences and often involve multiple causal elements.  Moreover, drivers 
are less likely to admit they crashed due to fatigue for reasons such as avoidance of 
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self-incrimination and social desirability (Morrow & Crum, 2004).  Lastly, near 
misses are reported to have a close association with actual accidents (Powell, 
Schechtman, & Riley, 2007)), thus making them a viable proxy.   
The questionnaire item asked participants if they had experienced a near miss 
that they thought was attributable to driving while fatigued in the past 6 months.  A 
description of a near miss was provided: “an incident on the road that, under different 
circumstances, could have resulted in personal harm, property damage or other loss”.  
The following example of a near miss was also provided: “e.g. Needing to brake 
suddenly to avoid hitting a vehicle in front because you failed to notice it was slowing 
down”.  
 
2.4 Data Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) and intercorrelations 
among the study variables were calculated.  Scale variables (occupational stress, 
safety climate and fatigue-related behaviour) were calculated by averaging item 
scores.  For the hierarchical regression analysis to predict fatigue-related driver 
behaviour, control variables (age, gender, hours per week driving) were entered at 
step 1.  The organisational variables occupational stress and safety climate were 
entered at step 2.  Logistic regression analysis was used to predict self-reported near 
misses as the near-miss variable was dichotomous in nature.  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations 
The mean scores, standard deviations, bivariate correlations and Cronbach’s 
alpha for the sample were calculated for the study variables and are presented in Table 
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2.  Intercorrelations among the scale variables was generally moderate (r = -.47 to 
.41).  The near miss variable was moderately correlated with self-reported fatigue-
related behavior (r = .40, p < .001), and weakly correlated with occupational stress 
and safety climate (r = .23, p < .01 and r = -.25, p < .001 respectively).  Driving hours 
per week only correlated weakly with both the near miss variable (r = .14, p < .05) 
and self-reported fatigue-related behaviour (r = .27, p < .001).   
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
3.2 Predictors of self-reported fatigue-related driver behaviour  
A hierarchical regression was conducted to examine whether occupational 
stress and organisational safety climate could predict self-reported fatigue-related 
driver behavior over and above other relevant factors.  The results are presented in 
Table 3.   
Overall, the model accounted for 39% of the variance in fatigue-related 
behavior, F (5,205) = 25.82, p < .001.  Occupational stress and organisational safety 
climate together were significant predictors of fatigue-related behavior, accounting for 
29% of the variance over and above that contributed by control variables, Fchange (2, 
205) = 48.23, p < .001.  The control variables together accounted for 10% of the 
variance in self-reported fatigue-related behaviour, F (3, 207) = 7.40, p < .001.  
Examining the unique variance revealed that organisational safety climate was a 
stronger predictor than occupational stress, accounting for 10% and 6% of the 
variance in fatigue-related behavior respectively. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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3.3. Predicting fatigue-related near misses 
A logistic regression was undertaken to examine whether the same variables 
used above could also predict self-reported near misses.  The analysis (target = 
reported near miss) revealed that the predictors did significantly predict near misses 
χ² (5, N = 204) = 23.30, p < .001 with Nagelkerke R2 indicating that 17.2% of the 
variance in near misses was accounted for by the predictors.  Overall 17.5% of near 
misses were correctly classified.  As shown in Table 4, examination of Wald statistics 
revealed only safety climate and occupational stress to be significant predictors of 
fatigue related near misses (p < .01 and p < .05 respectively).  Assessment of the 
Wald statistics and odds ratios suggested that drivers who reported more positive 
perceptions of the way in which their organisations view and manage safety were less 
likely to report having a fatigue-related near miss; and those who reported higher 
levels of occupational stress, were more likely to report having a fatigue-related near 
miss. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
4. Discussion  
The central aim of the present study was to empirically examine and evaluate 
the influence of occupational stress and organisational safety climate on fatigue-
related driver behaviour and fatigue-related near misses.  As the results demonstrate, 
both organisational safety climate and occupational stress were predictive of self-
reported fatigue-related driver behavior after controlling for several individual factors, 
with safety climate emerging as a stronger predictor than occupational stress.  In 
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addition, both organisational safety climate and occupational stress were significantly 
predictive of self-reported, fatigue-related near misses.  
The above results provide further support for the argument that safety climate 
exerts an influence over safety-related employee behavior.  The emergence of safety 
climate as a stronger predictor of fatigue-related behavior than occupational stress 
serves to highlight the relative importance of safety climate with respect to the 
fatigue-related behavior of drivers.   
These findings carry have strong practical utility.  While the results are sample 
specific, at a broader level they suggest that organisations should be cognizant of the 
impact that policies, practices and procedures can have on fatigue-related driver 
behaviour as well as safety behavior in general, and consider this in terms of the 
management of work-related driver safety and future safety planning.  In a practical 
sense, policies and procedures should be designed not only to enhance safety, but also 
they should be implemented in a way that ensures that employees perceive them as 
important and practical, given that safety climate represents the psychological 
manifestation of safety culture.  In other words, organisations may benefit from taking 
steps to openly promote or publicise their commitment to safety in order to develop 
and create a more positive safety climate.   
The issue of organisational liability is also particularly relevant and warrants 
consideration.  The present results suggest that organisations can have a direct effect 
on the safety behaviour of their employees via organisational safety climate, hence 
organisations may wish to consider their role in influencing driver safety and the 
creation of positive safety climates.  
The finding that occupational stress was predictive of fatigue-related behavior 
is particularly important for our understanding of occupational stress and its transfer 
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into the driving environment, as well as the implications for organisations.  
Organisations have a responsibility to manage and understand the potential impact of 
occupational stress.  One way to manage occupational stress is through intervention 
and prevention strategies.  Such strategies can be approached at both the 
organisational level and the individual level.  For example, at the organisational level 
clarification of roles through position evaluation and review, and careful position 
design have the potential to reduce occupational stress by reducing role ambiguity.  
Further, at the individual level counseling services, employee assistance programs and 
stress management training may also reduce occupational stress and in turn affect the 
safety behaviours of work-related drivers.  The benefit of such strategies is not limited 
to driver safety as the link between occupational stress and other factors such as 
absenteeism, job satisfaction, staff turnover, and general well-being is well 
documented (Jex, 1998).  Again managers would do well to consider exposure to 
liability and the role of organisations in occupational stress, particularly in cases 
where highly stressed individuals are involved in crashes.   
In considering the points mentioned above it must be remembered that the 
occupational stress measure used in the present study was an overall measure, and that 
occupational stress is both complex and multifaceted.  Notwithstanding this caveat, 
the relationship between occupational stress and work-related driver fatigue carries 
with it important implications for organisations.   
As mentioned earlier the use of self-reported near misses as an alternative, or 
proxy, outcome measure to vehicle crashes in driver safety research appears to be 
increasing in popularity, primarily due to the relative infrequency of crashes and 
associated measurement difficulties, particularly in the case of fatigue-related crashes.  
The results indicated that both occupational stress and organisational safety climate 
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were significant predictors of fatigue-related near misses.  However, only a relatively 
small proportion of the variance was explained by the independent variables and the 
classification of near misses based on these variables was limited suggesting that there 
are other important predictors of fatigue-related near misses not accounted for in this 
model.  Future studies may consider using other outcome measures in order to more 
closely examine the influence of occupational stress and safety climate on driver 
fatigue.  Despite this, the results serve to further strengthen the findings relevant to 
self-reported fatigue-related driver behaviour. 
 
5. Limitations 
Despite the practical implications of this study, there are a number of 
limitations that must be considered when interpreting the results.  There are 
limitations inherent to self-report research such as memory biases and social 
desirability, particularly with respect to the near miss measure.  However, these 
concerns must be balanced with recognition of the value of self-report measures in 
that we can, and have, learnt much from studies that utilise self-report data.  Further, 
the representativeness of the sample must be considered: though a response rate of 
30% was anticipated, as mentioned previously the final response rate was only 15%.  
Thus care should be taken in attempting to generalise the results to drivers from other 
populations.  Consequently future research should aim to utilise larger and more 
diverse samples of work-related drivers.  
The use of a composite measure of safety climate should also be noted, as 
previous research has shown safety climate to consist of a number of dimensions, 
including training, relationships and management commitment (Wills et al. 2005).  
While the present study utilised a combined safety climate score, it is possible that 
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certain aspects of safety climate captured by the measure may have had differing 
levels of influence on fatigue-related driver behavior.  Thus future research should 
aim to evaluate the influence of these dimensions of safety climate on fatigue-related 
driver safety.   
Previous research has shown that occupational stress is relatively complex.  As 
the present research used an overall measure of occupational stress, it is likely that it 
did not capture this complexity.  Accordingly, future research could employ more 
sensitive measures of occupational stress that tap specific aspects such as role 
ambiguity and role conflict and examine their impacts on fatigue-related driver safety.  
Similarly the present study sampled a limited number of influences on fatigue-related 
behaviour and near misses.  More complex investigations, involving a greater number 
of organisational, as well as individual factors are required to gain a more complete 
understanding of work-related driver fatigue.  
Finally, our purpose designed items “Drive after insufficient sleep”, “Drive 
after not much sleep”, and “Drive after working for extended periods of time” were 
subject to the interpretation of respondents and these interpretations may have varied 
considerably.  Specific definitions of insufficient sleep, not much sleep, and extended 
periods of time may have increased the sensitivity and face validity of the measure.  
 
6. Conclusions and future directions 
The growing concern over the role of driver fatigue in work-related traffic 
safety is warranted given the number of fatalities and incidents that are believed to be 
attributable to fatigue.  The present study suggests that the nature of the work 
environment influences work-related driver fatigue.  Intervention strategies would do 
well to acknowledge the contribution of organisational factors to driver fatigue-risk.   
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The findings from our study suggest that organisations can play a part in 
reducing fatigue-related crashes through attention to safety climate and occupational 
stress.  Effective organisations are likely to monitor individual workloads, as well as 
involve their workforce in developing and implementing clear procedures relating to 
work-related driving.  Managers in such organisations will take active stances in 
formulating safety policies and demonstrating the organisation’s commitment to these 
and to the safety of their workers. 
Future studies should aim to investigate other individual and organisational 
factors that contribute to work-related driver fatigue as well as examine the interaction 
between the two.  In addition, larger and more diverse samples as well as more 
diverse methodologies will counter the limitations noted in the present study.  Further 
investigation will provide a more comprehensive understanding of work-related driver 
fatigue that will inform and direct the design of prevention efforts. 
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Table 1.  
List of scale items used in the study. 
Scale and Items 
Job Related Tension Scale 
1. Feeling that you have too little authority to carry out the responsibilities assigned to you 
2. Being unclear on just what the scope and responsibilities of your job are 
3. Not knowing what opportunities for advancement or promotion exist for you 
4. Feeling that you have too heavy a workload 
5. Thinking that you’ll not be able to satisfy the conflicting demands of the various people 
over you 
6. Feeling that you’re not qualified to handle the job 
7. Not knowing what your immediate supervisor thinks of you, how he or she evaluates your 
performance 
8. The fact that you can’t get information needed to carry out your job 
9. Having to decide things that affect the lives of individuals, people that you know 
10. Feeling that you may not be liked and accepted by the people you work with 
11. Feeling unable to influence your immediate supervisor’s decisions and actions that affect 
you 
12. Not knowing just what the people you work with expect of you 
13. Thinking that the amount of work you have to do may interfere with how well it gets done 
14. Feeling that you have to do things on the job that are against your better judgement 
15. Feeling that your job tends to interfere with your family life 
Safety Climate Questionnaire 
1. Safety rules relating to the use of motor vehicles are followed even when the job is rushed 
2. Safety rules relating to the use of motor vehicles can be followed without conflicting with 
work practices 
3. Safety rules relating to the use of motor vehicles are always practical 
4. Employees can express their views about safety problems  
5. Employees can discuss important safety policy issues  
6. Employees are consulted when changes to driver safety practices are suggested  
7. Safety problems are openly discussed between employees and managers/supervisors 
8. Changes in procedures and their effects on safety are effectively communicated to 
workers 
9. Employees are told when changes are made to the working environment such as the 
vehicle, maintenance, or garaging procedures 
10. Employees are encouraged to support and look out for each other  
11. Safety policies relating to the use of motor vehicles are effectively communicated to 
workers 
12. Driver training is provided on skills specific to the type of vehicle driven for work 
13. Potential risks and consequences are identified in driver training 
14. Motor vehicle training is carried out by people with relevant experience 
15. Employees trust the management in this organisation 
16. Management trust the employees in this organisation 
17. Employees are confident about their future with the organisation 
18. Good working relationships exist in the organisation 
19. Morale is good 
20. When driving employees have enough time to carry out their tasks 
21. There are enough employees/drivers to carry out the required work 
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22. There is sufficient ‘thinking time’ to enable employees to plan and carry out their work to 
an adequate standard 
23. Problems that arise outside of employees’ control can be dealt with in a way that does not 
affect driver fatigue 
24. Time schedules for completing work projects are realistic 
25. Workload is reasonably balanced 
26. Changes in workload, which have been made at short notice, can be dealt with in a way 
that does not affect driver safety 
27. Employees are consulted for suggested vehicle/driver safety improvements 
28. Employees can easily identify the relevant procedure for each job 
29. An effective documentation management system ensures the availability of safety 
procedures relating to the use of motor vehicles 
30. Safety procedures relating to the use of motor vehicles are complete and comprehensive 
31. Safety procedures relating to the use of motor vehicles match the way tasks are done in 
practice 
32. Management are committed to motor vehicle safety 
33. Driver safety is seen as an important part of fleet management in this organisation 
34. Management are committed to driver safety 
35. Driver safety is central to management’s values and philosophies 
Fatigue-Related Behaviour 
1. Drive while fatigued 
2. Drive after having insufficient sleep 
3. Drive after not having much sleep 
4. Drive for longer than 2 hours without a break 
5. Drive after working for extended periods of time 
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Table 2  
Means, standard deviations, correlations among study variables and Cronbach’s alpha (for 
scale measures). 
Variable M SD Cronbach’s 
alpha 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Age 42.6 10.1  -       
2. Gender - -  .18** -      
3. Driving 
hours/week  
9.79 7.16  -.04 .05 -     
4. Safety climate 4.65 1.08 0.97 -.03 .13 -.04 -    
5. Occupational 
stress 
3.44 .66 0.90 -.14 .02 -.09 .47*** -   
6. Fatigue-
related 
behaviour 
3.43 .81 0.82 .07 -.15* -.27*** .44*** .41*** -  
7. Near misses - - - -.02 .04 .14* -.25*** -.23** -.40***  - 
 
 
*p < .05. **p < .01. p < .001*** 
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Table 3. 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting fatigue-related 
driver behaviour . 
Variables B SE β sr2 R2 Adj 
R2 
∆R2 
Step 1 – Control Variables        
Age -.01* .01 -.08 .02    
Gender .24** .11 .15 .04    
Hours per week driving   -.03** .01 -.26 .04    
     .10 .08 .10** 
Step 2 – Organisational 
Factors 
       
Occupational stress .36** .08 .28 .06    
Safety climate .26** .35 .35 .10    
     .39 .37 .29** 
*p < .05. **p < .01 
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Table 4.  
Logistic regression analysis for fatigue-related near misses. 
Variable B 
Std. 
error 
Wald 
test 
Odds 
ratio 
95.0% C.I. for 
odds ratio 
     Lower Upper 
Age -.02 .02 .65 .98 .95 1.02 
Gender -.33 .39 .72 .72 .33 1.55 
Hours per Week 
Driving 
.04 .02 2.15 1.04 .98 1.09 
Occupational Stress -.66 .32 4.20* .52 .28 .97 
Safety Climate -.53 .20 7.22** .59 .40 .87 
*p < .05 **p < .01 
 
 
